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I.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissal in a civil action. R. 246-47.
Therefore, the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(j) (Supp. 2002) (Supreme Court has jurisdiction over "orders, judgments, and
decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original
appellate jurisdiction").
II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

The primary issue presented for decision by this Court is:
Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the legislative
mandates establishing compulsory conditions precedent to
commencing litigation of malpractice actions against health
care providers as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 were
not satisfied by Plaintiffs/Appellants, thereby preventing
Plaintiffs/Appellants from commencing their action and
depriving the district court of jurisdiction.

R. 246, 248 at p. 41.
The standard of review of this issue is correction of error, without deference to the
trial court. This Court reviews "the trial court's summary judgment ruling for correctness.
[The Court] considers] only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly
concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed." Kessler v. Mortenson, 2000
UT 95, If 5, 16 P.3d 1225 (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Price Dev. Co., L.P. v. Orem
City, 2000 UT 26, \ 9, 995 P.2d 1237 ("In reviewing a summary judgment, we accord no
deference to the trial court and review its ruling for correctness.").
1

2.

Another issue for decision by the Court is whether Plaintiffs/Appellants

preserved for appeal claims that Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 is "unconstitutionally
overbroad." See Plaintiffs/Appellants' Brief at pp. 2-3. Plaintiffs/Appellants may not raise
issues for the first time on appeal, including constitutional issues, and Plaintiffs/Appellants
have failed to marshal the record to support any such claims. Notwithstanding, the trial
court did not violate Plaintiffs/Appellants' constitutional rights in correctly following the
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) (Supp. 2002). "[Wjhether a statute is
constitutional is a question of law, which we review for correctness, giving no deference to
the trial court." Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 25, \ 6, 44 P.3d 734 (citations
omitted). Further, a statute, including Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12, "is presumed
constitutional, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." Id.
(citing Utah Sch. Bds. Ass n v. State Bd ofEduc, 2001 UT 2,19, 17 P.3d 1125; State v.
Daniels, 2002 UT 2, If 30, 40 P.3d 611.
3.

Plaintiffs/Appellants are not entitled to seek declaratory relief in challenging

the constitutional validity of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 because they have not served the
attorney general with a copy of the proceeding as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11
(1996).

2

III.
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and regulations are determinative
or important to the resolution of this appeal. The more pertinent provisions are set forth
below as follows:
1.
Utah Constitution, Article VII, Section 5. [Jurisdiction of district court and
other courts—Right of appeal.]
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except
as limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all
extraordinary writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction
as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both
original and appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters
filed originally with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an
appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with
appellate jurisdiction over the cause.
2.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1996). Legislative findings and
declarations-Purpose of act.
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims
for damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising
from health care has increased greatly in recent years. Because of
these increases the insurance industry has substantially increased the
cost of medical malpractice insurance. The effect of increased
insurance premiums and increased claims is increased health care
cost, both through the health care providers passing the cost of
premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing
defensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary
in a lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are discouraged
from continuing to provide services because of the high cost and
possible unavailability of malpractice insurance.
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the
adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's health
care system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting
measures designed to encourage private insurance companies to
3

continue to provide health-related malpractice insurance while at the
same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of
insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from private
companies.
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to
provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced
against health care providers while limiting that time to a
specific period for which professional liability insurance
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to
provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation
and settlement of claims.
3.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3 (Supp. 2002). Definitions.

(8) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing created in Section 58-1-103.

(10) "Health care" means any act or treatment performed or furnished,
or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health care
provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical
care, treatment, or confinement.

(14) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach
of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal
injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which
should have been rendered by the health care provider.

(20) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health care
provider, under a contract, express or implied.
4.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1996). Statute of limitations-ExceptionsApplication.
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be
brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered the injury, whichever first occurs. . . .
4

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8 (1996). Notice of intent to commence action.
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be initiated
unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his
executor or successor, at least ninety days' prior notice of intent to
commence an action. Such notice shall include a general statement of
the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, time and place
of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of
misconduct on the part of the prospective defendant, the nature of the
alleged injuries and other damages sustained. Notice may be in letter
or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his attorney. Service
shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the manner
prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the
summons and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return
receipt requested, in which case notice shall be deemed to have been
served on the date of mailing. Such notice shall be served within the
time allowed for commencing a malpractice action against a health
care provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days prior to the
expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the
malpractice action against the health care provider shall be extended
to 120 days from the date of service of notice. . . .

6.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002). Division to provide
panel-Exemption- Procedures-Statute of limitations tolled-Composition of
panel-Expenses-Division authorized to set license fees.
(l)(a) The division shall provide a hearing panel in alleged medical
liability cases against health care providers as defined in Section
78-14-3, except dentists.
(b)(i) The division shall establish procedures for prelitigation
consideration of medical liability claims for damages arising
out of the provision of or alleged failure to provide health care.
(ii) The division may establish rules necessary to administer
the process and procedures related to prelitigation hearings and
the conduct of prelitigation hearings in accordance with
Sections 78-14-12 through 78-14-16.
(c) The proceedings are informal, nonbinding, and are not
subject to Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act, but are compulsory as a condition precedent to
commencing litigation.
5

(d) Proceedings conducted under authority of this section are
confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process.
(2)(a) The party initiating a medical liability action shall file a request for
prelitigation panel review with the division within 60 days after the service
a statutory notice of intent to commence action under Section 78-14-8.
(b) The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent to
commence action. The request shall be mailed to all health
care providers named in the notice and request.
(3)(a) The filing of a request for prelitigation panel review under this
section tolls the applicable statute of limitations until the earlier of
60 days following the division's issuance of an opinion by the
prelitigation panel, or 60 days following the termination of
jurisdiction by the division as provided in this subsection. The
division shall send any opinion issued by the panel to all parties by
regular mail.
(b)(i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under
this section within 180 days after the filing of the request for
prelitigation panel review, or within any longer period as
agreed upon in writing by all parties to the review.
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within
the time limits established in Subsection (3)(b)(i), the division
has no further jurisdiction over the matter subject to review
and the claimant is considered to have complied with all
conditions precedent required under this section prior to the
commencement of litigation.
(c)(i) The claimant and any respondent may agree by written
stipulation that no useful purpose would be served by
convening a prelitigation panel under this section.
(ii) When the stipulation is filed with the division, the division
shall within ten days after receipt enter an order divesting itself
of jurisdiction over the claim, as it concerns the stipulating
respondent, and stating that the claimant has complied with all
conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation
regarding the claim. . . .

6

7.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11 (1996). Parties.
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made
parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected
by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights
of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding
which involves the validity of a municipal or county ordinance
or franchise such municipality or county shall be made a party,
and shall be entitled to be heard, and if a statute or state
franchise or permit is alleged to be invalid the attorney general
shall be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to
be heard.
IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal was brought to challenge the Order of Dismissal issued by the district
court. The defendants in the underlying action, McKay-Dee Hospital Center; Intermountain
Health Care, Inc.; Ivan D. Wright, M.D.; Harold Vonk, M.D.; and Ronald S. Rankin, M.D.
(hereinafter "Health Care Appellees") all moved to dismiss Plaintiffs/Appellants'
(hereinafter "Heir Appellants") claims for failure to comply with the compulsory
conditions precedent to commencing a malpractice claim mandated by the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act (the "Act") as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 (Supp. 2002) et

Following briefing by the parties and oral argument, the trial court on February 4,
2001 entered its order granting the Health Care Appellees' motions. R. 245-48.1 The trial

l

A copy of the trial court's order, which includes findings of fact and conclusions of
law, is included in the Addendum hereto.
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court, considering the motions to dismiss as motions for summary judgment under Rule 56
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, ruled in favor of Health Care Appellees. R. 245-48.
The trial court found that although the Heir Appellants had filed the Notice of Intent
to Commence Litigation with the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing
("Division"), it was undisputed that the Heir Appellants had failed to mail the Request for
Prelitigation Review to all the named health care providers in the action. The court
therefore found "Because plaintiffs did not satisfy the conditions precedent to commencing
litigation, the Court concludes that plaintiffs could not commence their action. Further,
because the plaintiffs' action could not be and was not commenced, this Court lacks
jurisdiction and is compelled to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint." R. 247. Heir Appellants
subsequently brought this appeal challenging the Order of Dismissal issued by the district
court. R. 249-51.
V.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented to this Court for review.
The material and determinative facts regarding the Heir Appellants' claims are as follows:
1.

Heir Appellants' underlying malpractice claims (relating to the death of

Norma Mary Harriman on March 3, 1999) are subject to the provisions of the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 (Supp. 2002) et seq. R. 1-9.
2.

Each of the Health Care Appellees is a "Health care provider" as defined by

the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(11) (1996).
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3.

Under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, a "'Malpractice action against a

health care provider' means any action against a health care provider, whether in contract,
tort, breach of warranty, wrongful death, or otherwise, based upon alleged personal injuries
relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should have been rendered by the
health care provider." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-3(14) (Supp. 2002).
4.

The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act also sets forth various conditions

which are "compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002).
5.

Heir Appellants were aware of the requirements of the Utah Health Care

Malpractice Act when on February 14, 2001 they mailed Health Care Appellees a "notice
of intent to commence action" as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-8. R. 258, at p. 13.
6.

Despite the admission of counsel for Heir Appellants that no filing fee was

paid to the Division, R. 258 at p. 12, the court found that "a question of fact exists regarding
whether a request for prelitigation panel review was 'filed' with the Division of
Occupational and Professional Licensing." R. 246.
7.

However, it is undisputed that "neither the plaintiffs nor their counsel

complied with the requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) that the request for
prelitigation hearing 'shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the notice and
request.5" R. 246.
8.

Affidavit testimony was introduced that the Division had no record of a

Request for Prelitigation having been filed, and that "Because a Request was not filed with
the Division and the required filing fee was not submitted to the Division, no action was
9

taken or required to be taken by the Division in this matter, and no prehtigation review was
approved." R. 49.
9.

Despite having failed to satisfy the conditions precedent to commencing

litigation specified in Section 78-14-12, Heir Appellants filed an action in the Third
District Court on June 13, 2001, alleging negligence and wrongful death against the Health
Care Appellees. R. 1-7.
10.

Health Care Appellants moved to dismiss Heir Appellants' complaint because

Heir Appellants failed to satisfy all conditions under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act
which are "compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002). R. 13-15; 112-14; 171-73; 188-95.
11.

Heir Appellants opposed the motions to dismiss, filing various memoranda in

opposition. R. 22-25; 78-86; 154-66; 196-99; 208-10.
12.

On December 19, 2001, oral argument was heard on the motions to dismiss,

and the court ruled in favor of the Health Care Appellees. R. 258 at pp.3 8-44.
13.

On February 4, 2002, the Honorable Timothy Hansen entered an Order of

Dismissal. The trial court made the following findings:
3.
However, the Court finds that it is undisputed that
neither the plaintiffs nor their counsel complied with the
requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) that the
request for prehtigation hearing "shall be mailed to all health
care providers named in the notice and request." In light of the
plaintiffs' failure to mail the request for prehtigation to any of
the health care providers, the Court finds that plaintiffs failed
to comply with the statutory requirements which "are
compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing
litigation."

10

4.
The Court therefore concludes that the Court has no
jurisdiction based on the legislative mandates set forth in the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1
et seq.
5.
Because plaintiffs did not satisfy the conditions
precedent to commencing litigation, the Court concludes that
plaintiffs could not commence their action. Further, because
the plaintiffs' action could not be and was not commenced, this
Court lacks jurisdiction and is compelled to dismiss plaintiffs'
complaint.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND
DECREED that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the statutory
conditions precedent to commencing litigation and therefore
the defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED and the
above-entitled action against the defendants SHALL BE AND
IS HEREBY DISMISSED.
R. 245-48, attached to Addendum.
14.

Heir Appellants filed a notice of appeal of the trial court's Order of

Dismissal on March 4, 2002. R. 249-51.
15.

Although Heir Appellants now seek to challenge the constitutional validity of

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12, they have failed to serve the attorney general with a copy of
the proceeding as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11(1996) in order to obtain the
declaratory relief sought. See Heir Appellants Brief at pp. 2-3.
VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly ruled that the legislative mandates establishing compulsory
conditions precedent to commencing litigation of malpractice actions against health care
providers as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002) were not satisfied by

11

Heir Appellants, thereby preventing them from commencing their action and depriving the
district court of jurisdiction. In 1985, the Utah State Legislature amended the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 (Supp. 2002) et seq., to create the
prelitigation panel process and specified that this procedure is a compulsory condition
precedent to commencing litigation of a medical malpractice claim. See Utah Legislative
Report 1985, S.B 153. Prior to 1985, the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act had no
provision for and did not require the prelitigation review process now codified in Section
78-14-12. In enacting Section 78-14-12, the legislature clearly specified that compliance
with the prelitigation requirements is "compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing
litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002). The plain language of the
legislature clearly expresses the intent that these requirements must be completed prior to
commencement of a medical malpractice action.
It is undisputed that Heir Appellants did not mail a copy of their Request for
Prelitigation Panel Review to all the named health-care providers in this action. This
undisputed fact is determinative of the issues. Thus, the district court properly found that
"Because plaintiffs did not satisfy the conditions precedent to commencing litigation, the
Court concludes that plaintiffs could not commence their action. Further, because the
plaintiffs' action could not be and was not commenced, this Court lacks jurisdiction and is
compelled to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint." R. 246.
In addition, Heir Appellants are precluded from raising issues for the first time on
appeal, including constitutional issues, and Heir Appellants have failed to cite that portion
of the record to support any such claims. The constitutional issues brought in this appeal
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were either not raised before the trial court or were so inadequately briefed and argued that
the trial court had no meaningful opportunity to rule upon them. Therefore, any such issues
have not been preserved for appeal. Notwithstanding, the trial court did not violate any
constitutional rights by correctly following the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-1412(2)(b) (Supp. 2002).
Further, this Court should refuse to consider any constitutional challenges to the
Act based upon the Division's alleged actions because they are irrelevant to the court's
order. The trial court's Order of Dismissal was based upon the undisputed fact that Heir
Appellants failed to mail a copy of their Request for Prelitigation Panel Review to all
named health-care providers in the action. The Division's conduct was simply not
considered in the trial court's dismissal. Moreover, Heir Appellants are not entitled to
seek declaratory relief in challenging the constitutional validity of Utah Code Ann. § 7814-12 (Supp. 2002) because they have not served the attorney general with a copy of the
proceeding as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11 (1996).
VII.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER IS BASED ON UNDISPUTED FACTS AND THE
PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT.
The only issue raised by Heir Appellants which relates to arguments properly raised
before the trial court is the issue of the effect of Heir Appellants' undisputed failure to
comply "with the requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) that the request for
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prelitigation hearing 'shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the notice and
request.'" R. 246. The trial court's order is consistent with the plain language of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act (the "Act"), Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1 (Supp. 2002) et seq.,
as well as appellate court opinions upholding the Act.
A,

The Trial Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction Because Heir Appellants
Failed to Comply with the Compulsory Conditions Precedent of the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act.
Utah appellate courts have consistently held that "[i]f these requirements [of the

Utah Health Care Malpractice Act] are not fully met, the action will be dismissed."' Carter
v. Milford Valley Memorial Hosp., 2000 UT App 21, % 13, 996 P.2d 1076 (citing Malone
v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 134 (Utah 1992); Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990);
Allen v. Intermountain Health Caref Inc., 635 P.2d 30, 30-31 (Utah 1981)). The trial
court properly found that because the requirements of the Act were not satisfied, the Heir
Appellants' action must be dismissed:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
the plaintiffs did not satisfy the statutory conditions precedent
to commencing litigation and therefore the defendants5
Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED and the above-entitled
action against the defendants SHALL BE AND IS HEREBY
DISMISSED.
R. 246-47.
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act clearly states that no malpractice litigation
against a health care provider may be commenced until the plaintiff satisfies conditions
which "are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002). It is clear that the prelitigation panel review process
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set forth in Section 78-14-12 are operative in the commencement of a medical malpractice
action and determine when and how an action can be commenced. Heir Appellants were
obviously aware of the Act's requirements when on February 14, 2001 they mailed Health
Care Appellees a "notice of intent to commence action" as required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-8 (1996). R. 258, at p. 13. However, Heir Appellants failed to comply with the
other requirements of the Act.
The issues before this Court are readily resolved in favor of Health Care Appellees
through the proper statutory interpretation of the applicable statutes. As the Utah Supreme
Court has held:
When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look
first to the plain language of the statute. In so doing, [w]e
presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and give
effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted
meaning. We will not infer substantive terms into the text that
are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based
on the language used, and [we have] no power to rewrite the
statute to conform to an intention not expressed.
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 2001 UT 29, f 12, 24 P.3d 928 (quotation
marks and citations omitted, alterations in original). Thus, each word is given effect. In
addition, the statutory scheme is interpreted as a comprehensive whole.
The primary role of statutory interpretation is to give effect to
the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute
was meant to achieve. The best indicator of that intent is the
plain language of the statute. Also, [a] general rule of statutory
construction is that a statute should be construed as a
comprehensive whole.
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Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm Vz, 916 P.2d 344, 358 (Utah 1996) quotation
marks and citations omitted, alterations in original). Principles of statutory construction
and interpretation are well established.
In matters of statutory construction, "[t]he best evidence of the
true intent and purpose of the Legislature in enacting [an] Act is
the plain language of the Act." "[Statutory enactments are to be
construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and
meaningful." Likewise, we are compelled to give the statutory
language meaning and to assume that "each term in the statute
was used advisedly . . . unless such a reading is unreasonably
confused or inoperable." We will avoid an interpretation which
renders portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or
inoperative.
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997) (citing State v. Hunt,
906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995); Savage Indus., Inc. v. State Tax Comm yn, 811 P.2d 664,
670 (Utah 1991); Jensen v. Intermountain Health Caref Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah
1984); Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980)).
An examination of the plain language of the relevant statutes and of the statutory
scheme construed as a whole demonstrates that the Heir Appellants failed to comply with
statutory conditions precedent. Therefore, by the plain language of the Act, before a
medical malpractice action can be commenced, certain prerequisites must be satisfied.
The statutory scheme in question is not ambiguous. The Act clearly states that no
malpractice litigation against a health care provider may be commenced until the plaintiff
satisfies conditions which "are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing
litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002). The inclusion of this language

16

in the statute indicates the legislature's intention to define how and when a medical
malpractice action can be commenced.
Also, each word should be given effect. Condition precedent is defined as follows:
"A condition precedent is one . . . which is to be performed before some right dependent
thereon accrues, or some act dependent thereon is performed." Black's Law Dictionary,
(6th Ed. 1991). The use of "condition precedent" should be given its plain meaning.
In addition, the statute plainly requires the "filing of a request for prelitigation panel
review under this section." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3) (Supp. 2002). The Act
specifies requirements for requesting prelitigation panel review:
(2)(a) The party initiating a medical liability action shall file a
request for prelitigation panel review with the division within
60 days after the service of a statutory notice of intent to
commence action under Section 78-14-8.
(b) The request shall include a copy of the notice of intent to
commence action. The request shall be mailed to all health
care providers named in the notice and request.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added). As a matter of law,
compliance with the terms of the Act requires more than mere delivery of a notice of intent
and request for prelitigation review to the Division. The requirements under Section 7814-12 include that "[t]he request shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the
notice and request." Id. (emphasis added).
It is also well established that "[t]he form of the verb used in a
statute, i.e., something 'may,' 'shall' or 'must' be done, is the
single most important textual consideration determining
whether a statute is mandatory or directory."
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"According to its ordinary construction, the term 'may' means
permissive, and it should receive that interpretation unless such
a construction would be obviously repugnant to the intention of
the Legislature or would lead to some other inconvenience or
absurdity." The term "shall," on the other hand, "is usually
presumed mandatory and has been interpreted as such
previously in this and other jurisdictions."
State in Interest ofM.C, 940 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted).
"The meaning of the word shall is ordinarily that of command." Herr v. Salt Lake County,
525 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1974). As a result the trial court had no discretion to disregard
this statutory requirement. "This mandatory language leaves no discretion to the court."
Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, U 76, 5 P.3d 616.
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B.

The Heir Appellants' Failure to Comply with Statutory Conditions Precedent
Prevented the Commencement of their Medical Malpractice Action.
It is undisputed that "neither the plaintiffs nor their counsel complied with the

requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) that the request for prelitigation hearing
'shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the notice and request.'" R. 246, 258
at pp. 40-41. This requirement is not merely a procedural nicety, but would have alerted
the Health Care Appellees to the attempted initiation of prelitigation proceedings and
would have warned them of the possibility that following the prescribed 180-day period the
prelitigation requirement might be deemed satisfied. As it was, the Heir Appellants' failure
to mail a copy of the purported request for prelitigation panel review to any of the Health
Care Appellees deprived the Health Care Appellees of the opportunity to protect their
entitlement to timely prelitigation review under the Act.
Because the Heir Appellants did not comply with the Act's prelitigation
requirements as to Health Care Appellees, they could not commence their action and their
complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the trial court. The trial court's
findings and order are clear:
3.
However, the Court finds that it is undisputed that
neither the plaintiffs nor their counsel complied with the
requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) that the
request for prelitigation hearing "shall be mailed to all health
care providers named in the notice and request." In light of the
plaintiffs' failure to mail the request for prelitigation to any of
the health care providers, the Court finds that plaintiffs failed
to comply with the statutory requirements which "are
compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing
litigation."
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4.
The Court therefore concludes that the Court has no
jurisdiction based on the legislative mandates set forth in the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-1
et seq.
5.
Because plaintiffs did not satisfy the conditions
precedent to commencing litigation, the Court concludes that
plaintiffs could not commence their action. Further, because
the plaintiffs' action could not be and was not commenced, this
Court lacks jurisdiction and is compelled to dismiss plaintiffs'
complaint.
R. 246-47.
Because Heir Appellants never satisfied the conditions precedent they could not
commence their medical malpractice litigation. The Kansas Supreme Court, interpreting
similar statutory language, found clear legislative intent preventing the commencement of
litigation absent the completion of conditions precedent. In Gessner v. Phillips County
Commissioners, 11 P.3d 1131 (Kan. 2000), the plaintiffs filed suit against the county for
injuries sustained in an automobile accident involving an ambulance which belonged to the
county. Similar to the case at hand, in Gessner the initial "actions were dismissed by the
trial court for lack of jurisdiction" because of the failure to comply with statutory
conditions precedents "prior to filing the suits." Id. at 1132.
Examining the relevant statutory provisions including the specific language "before
commencing such action" and "no action shall be commenced until," the court held that
such language "expresses a clear legislative intent to disallow the commencement of any
actions prior to the filing of the requisite notice." Id. at 1133-34 (emphasis added). The
court further referred to the statutory notice prerequisite as "a jurisdictional prerequisite to
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commencing a lawsuit" and as a "condition precedent to the filing of an action." Id, at
1134. Consequently, the court held:
It is clear that the legislature intended that failure to provide
the appropriate notice must be construed to preclude
claimants from commencing a legal action. The failure to
file a claim against a municipality, pursuant to [the
statutory condition precedent], is not cured by the
application of the savings statute . . . .
We can reach no other conclusion but that the plaintiffs'
actions were not commenced until well beyond the applicable 2
year period of limitations and the trial court correctly entered
orders of dismissal of all three cases.
Id, (emphasis added). As was the case in Gessner, the Heir Appellants' failure to timely
comply with conditions precedent prevented the commencing of litigation.
Excusing Heir Appellants' disregard of the statutory provisions would defeat the
very essence of the object sought to be accomplished by the legislature: that certain
conditions are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (Supp. 2002). Heir Appellants should not be allowed to
knowingly disregard the requirements and time frame established by the Act through the
application of the savings statute.
C.

The Statute of Limitations Was Not Tolled and Ran Prior to Heir Appellants'
Filing of this Complaint.
The statutory scheme set forth in the Act focuses on what is the proper statute of

limitations period. It is uncontested that the applicable statute of limitations governing
Heir Appellants' medical malpractice claims is set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4
(1996). The legislature crafted the Act to include provisions ensuring that the statute of

21

limitations is tolled during the prelitigation process, which is compulsory as a condition
precedent to commencing litigation. The clear intent is that prior to commencing litigation
of a medical malpractice claim, the prelitigation process must be properly initiated within
the original statute of limitations. In the medical malpractice context, a plaintiff cannot toll
or extend the statute of limitations by simply filing a complaint in district court when the
conditions precedent to commencing litigation have not been met.
The only way to toll the statute of limitations is to file a notice of intent pursuant to
Section 78-14-8 and to properly initiate the prelitigation panel review pursuant to Section
78-14-12. Because Heir Appellants did not comply with the statutory prerequisites, "the
running of the statute of limitations was not tolled." Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 136
(Utah 1992); see also Kittredge v. Shaddy, 2001 UT 7, 20 P.3d 285 (holding statute of
limitations not tolled in medical malpractice action for failure to timely file request for
prelitigation panel review).
Heir Appellants' complaint was dismissed because it was filed prematurely. Section
78-14-12(l)(c) clearly states that the prelitigation panel review proceedings are
"compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation." To satisfy the
compulsory conditions precedent, generally a prelitigation panel review takes place and the
Division issues an opinion by the prelitigation panel. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(a)
(Supp. 2002). It is undisputed that no such review occurred in this matter. However, two
alternatives means are provided to satisfy "all conditions precedent required under [Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-12] prior to the commencement of litigation." Utah Code Ann. § 7814-12(3)(b)(ii) (Supp. 2002) (emphasis added.) In this case, neither alternative was
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satisfied at the time Heir Appellants filed their complaint. Again, this statutory plain
language reinforces the legislative intent that a petitioner must have complied with all
conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation regarding the claim.
One alternative to completing a prelitigation panel review is that "the claimant and
any respondent may agree by written stipulation" to waive the prelitigation requirements.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(c)(i) (Supp. 2002). If such a "stipulation is filed with the
division, the division shall within ten days after receipt enter an order divesting itself of
jurisdiction over the claim, as it concerns the stipulating respondent, and stating that the
claimant has complied with all conditions precedent to the commencement of litigation
regarding the claim." Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(c)(ii) (Supp. 2002). No such
stipulation or order exists in this case.
The second alternative to prelitigation review, which Heir Appellants attempt to
invoke, is set forth in Section 78-14-12(3)(b). That section of the Act provides:
(b)(i) The division shall complete a prelitigation hearing under
this section within 180 days after the filing of the request for
prelitigation panel review, or within any longer period as
agreed upon in writing by all parties to the review.
(ii) If the prelitigation hearing has not been completed within
the time limits established in Subsection (3)(b)(i), the
division has no further jurisdiction over the matter subject to
review and the claimant is considered to have complied with all
conditions precedent required under this section prior to the
commencement of litigation.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3)(b) (emphasis added). Once again, the legislature used the
plain language that all conditions precedent required under this section must be complied
with prior to the commencement of litigation.
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Heir Appellants erroneously argue that they were entitled under the second
alternative found in Section 78-14-12(3)(b)(ii) to file their complaint. As can be seen in
the statutory language, before this alternative can be applied, the prehtigation process must
have been properly commenced and the division accepted jurisdiction. Only if the
Division's jurisdiction has been properly invoked and if the prehtigation review process has
not been completed within the 180-day period, then after that time "the division has no
further jurisdiction over the matter subject to review and the claimant is considered to have
complied with all conditions precedent required under this section pnor to the
commencement of litigation." Id. However, Heir Appellants failed to properly invoke the
Divisions' jurisdiction because they failed to comply with the requirements of Section 7814-12. Even accepting, for the sake of argument only, Heir Appellants' representation that
on February 14, 2001, they filed a request for prehtigation review, their complaint was
prematurely filed on June 13, 2001-well before the completion of the 180-day period.
When Heir Appellants filed their complaint, Heir Appellants could not as a matter of law
be "considered to have complied with all conditions precedent required under this section
prior to the commencement of litigation." Consequently, the Heir Appellants' claim was
properly dismissed. As a matter of law, their complaint was premature because il was filed
June 13, 2001, well before the expiration of the 180-day period during which jurisdiction
rests exclusively with the Division.
The Heir Appellants argument that the district court has "concurrent jurisdiction"
with the Division simply lacks any support. As previously set forth, a concept of
concurrent jurisdiction conflicts with the plain meaning of the Act. The statutory scheme
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recognizes the exclusive jurisdiction of the Division during properly initiated prelitigation
proceedings and provides for the tolling of the statute of limitations before the completion
of the conditions precedent to commencing litigation. A petitioner who complies with the
Act and who timely files for and properly initiates the prelitigation panel review will thus
not be precluded from filing a complaint in district court once the panel issues its opinion
and a Certificate of Compliance. Heir Appellants ignore the plain language of the statute
and simply refer to Section 78-3-4 in claiming there is "concurrent jurisdiction." Heir
Appellants' Brief at p. 8. However, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (Supp. 2002) provides:
"The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, not excepted in
the Utah Constitution and not prohibited by law." Utah Constitution, Article VII, Section 5
provides, in pertinent part, that "The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all
matters except as limited by this constitution or by statute." The Act specifically limits the
jurisdiction of the district court by setting forth conditions precedent to the
commencement of a malpractice action against a health care provider.
Further, contrary to Heir Appellants' insinuation, Avila v. Winn, 794 P.2d 20 (Utah
1990), does not stand for the proposition that the Utah Supreme Court condones or
approves of the filing of a medical malpractice action prior to the satisfaction of the
compulsory conditions precedent of the prelitigation process review. In contrast, the Utah
Supreme Court stated: "[W]e do not condone the act of filing a complaint before the time
specified in the Malpractice Act. The instant case is an exception necessitated by
procedural errors and omissions." Id. at 23. The circumstances present in that case are
clearly not present in the case at hand.
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POINT II.
HEIR APPELLANTS HAVE WAIVED ANY CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO
THE UTAH HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT BECAUSE THEY WERE NOT
ADEQUATELY RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
Heir Appellants are precluded from raising issues for the first time on appeal,
including constitutional issues, and Heir Appellants have failed to cite to the record to
support any such claims. "Under ordinary circumstances, appellate courts will not consider
an issue, including a constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the
trial court committed plain error." State ex rel E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ^ 9, n.3, 21 P.3d
680 (citing State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70, t 8, 9 P.3d 164). The alleged constitutional
issues presented by Heir Appellants as issues "II" and "III" on pages 1-3 of their Brief were
not properly raised before the trial court. "[CJlaims not raised before the trial court may
not be raised on appeal. . . . [This] preservation rule applies to every claim, including
constitutional questions." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 10 P.3d 346. It has long
been established that "[i]ssues not raised at trial cannot be raised on appeal. This general
rule applies equally to constitutional issues, with the limited exception of where a person's
liberty is at stake." Pratt v. City Council of City ofRiverton, 639 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah
1981).
Because Heir Appellants did not raise constitutional issues before the district court,
they are precluded from raising them now. The failure to raise constitutional challenges is
demonstrated by a review of the record. "For a question to be considered on appeal, the
record must clearly show that it was timely presented to the trial court in a manner
sufficient to obtain a ruling thereon." Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d
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1040, 1045 (Utah 1983). Heir Appellants' have failed to cite pertinent portions of the
record to satisfy this burden. Heir Appellants simply mention the term "due process" and
fail to cite any authority or make any substantive argument or meaningful discussion which
would have enabled the trial court to address any such constitutional claim. R. 204, 258 at
pp. 27, 29.
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely
bring the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing
the court an opportunity to rule on the issue's merits . . . .
[T]he mere mention of an issue in the pleadings, when no
supporting evidence or relevant legal authority is introduced at
trial in support of the claim, is insufficient to raise an issue at
trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal.
LeBaron & Associates, Inc. v. Rebel Enterprises, Inc., 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (citing James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801-02 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Turtle
Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982)). Heir
Appellants simply failed to provide any record citation wherein they preserved
constitutional issues for appeal.
Similarly, the argument in Heir Appellants' Brief is inadequate to raise
constitutional issues for appeal. "[A] reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly
defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which the appealing
party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450
(Utah 1988) (citation omitted).
Although Heir Appellants' Brief cites four cases in its discussion regarding the
constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002), Heir Appellants do "not
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analyze these cases to demonstrate that [their] contentions compel reversal of the trial
court's ruling." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 7, 1 P.3d 1108.
This court has repeatedly held that appealing parties must
"'clearly define[ ] ' " the issues presented on appeal "'with
pertinent authority cited.'" Likewise, Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 24 unequivocally requires, that "[Appellant's brief]
shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented, including . . . citations to the
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."
Consequently, "[i]t is well established that a reviewing court
will not address arguments that are not adequately briefed."
Water & Energy Systems Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, ^ 20, 48 P.3d 888
(citations omitted). Because, Heir Appellants' Brief in this case "fails to adequately set
forth an argument as required by Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure"
it "may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court." State v. Gamblin,
2000 UT 44,fflf7-8, 1 P.3d 1108.
POINT III.
HEIR APPELLANTS HAVE NOT ESTABLISHED THAT THE ACT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
In addition to failing to preserve the issue for appeal, Heir Appellants have failed to
establish that the Act is unconstitutional. Statutes are presumed constitutional.
"Furthermore, to the extent we are making a determination of a statute's constitutionality,
the 'statute is presumed constitutional, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of
constitutionality.'" Grand County v. Emery County, 2002 UT 25, ^ 6, 44 P.3d 734 (citing
Utah Sch. Bds. Ass 'n v. State Bd. ofEduc, 2001 UT 2, ^ 9, 17 P.3d 1125; State v.
Daniels, 2002 UT 2, \ 30, 40 P.3d 611).
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In addition, the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act has been previously upheld as
constitutional. In Allen v Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 635 P.2d 30 (Utah 1981), the
court held the statute, which allows a two-year statute of limitations period for malpractice
actions, is not unconstitutional. The court found that the legislative determination to have
the shortened two-year statute of limitation in order to "insure the continued availability of
adequate health care services" was not arbitrary or unreasonable. Id. at 32. Although the
statutory conditions precedent impose conditions on a claimant's ability to commence
litigation against health care providers, like any other reasonable legislative condition they
do not restrict or preclude a claimant's ability to proceed if those conditions are satisfied.
Thus, Heir Appellants' representations that the only purpose of the Act is to "expedite early
evaluation and settlement of claims," Heir Appellants' Brief at p. 17, disregards the plain
language of the Act and prior rulings of the Utah Supreme Court. The stated purpose of the
act is as follows:
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and
claims for damages and the amount of judgments and
settlements arising from health care has increased greatly in
recent years. Because of these increases the insurance
industry has substantially increased the cost of medical
malpractice insurance. The effect of increased insurance
premiums and increased claims is increased health care cost,
both through the health care providers passing the cost of
premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing
defensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential
adversary in a lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers
are discouraged from continuing to provide services because of
the high cost and possible unavailability of malpractice
insurance.
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of
alleviating the adverse effects which these trends are
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producing in the public's health care system, it is necessary to
protect the public interest by enacting measures designed
to encourage private insurance companies to continue to
provide health-related malpractice insurance while at the
same time establishing a mechanism to ensure the
availability of insurance in the event that it becomes
unavailable from private companies.
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to
provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced
against health care providers while limiting that time to a
specific period for which professional liability insurance
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to
provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation
and settlement of claims.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (1996) (emphasis added).
Contrary to Heir Appellants' characterization, the Act does not simply "eliminate
lawsuits against providers of medical care." Heir Appellants' Brief at p. 18. The Act serves
to further the legislature's legitimate purpose of protecting the public interest. Heir
Appellants have not been deprived of any constitutional rights.
POINT IV.
BECAUSE HEIR APPELLANTS HAVE NOT COMPLIED WITH UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-33-11 (1996) THEY ARE NOT ENTITLED TO DECLARATORY RELIEF
Heir Appellants are not entitled to seek declaratory relief in challenging the
constitutional validity of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12 (Supp. 2002) because they have not
served the attorney general with a copy of the proceeding as required by Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-33-11 (1996). When a statute is alleged to be invalid, as Heir Appellants contend, the
attorney general must be given a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard:
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made
parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected
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by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights
of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding
which involves the validity of a municipal or county ordinance
or franchise such municipality or county shall be made a party,
and shall be entitled to be heard, and if a statute or state
franchise or permit is alleged to be invalid the attorney
general shall be served with a copy of the proceeding and
be entitled to be heard.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11 (1996) (emphasis added). Because Heir Appellants are
challenging the validity of state statutes, before obtaining declaratory relief they should
have notified the attorney general.
IX.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, McKay-Dee Hospital respectfully requests
that the Court affirm the judgment of the trial court.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 18 TH day of September 2002.

BURBIDGE, CARNAHAN & WHITE
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JoAnn E. Camahar
Paul D. Van Komen
Attorneys for Appellees McKay-Dee Hospital Center
and Intermountain Health Care, Inc.
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Addendum

JoAnn E. Carnahan (#5262)
Paul D. Van Komen (#7332)
BURBIDGE, CARNAHAN, OSTLER & WHITE,
Attorneys for Defendants McKay-Dee Hospital Center
and Intermountain Health Care, Inc.
1400 Key Bank Tower
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 359-7000

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

FEB - 4 2002
SALT LAW/COUNTY
Deputy-Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HELEN LABELLE, SHEILA CARLSON,
LINDA BUCKLEY and MARILYN
PHILLIPS, individuals and as heirs of Norma
Mary Harriman,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

Plaintiffs,
vs.
MCKAY DEE HOSPITAL CENTER,
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC.,
Utah corporations, DR. IVAN D. WRIGHT,
DR. HAROLD VONK and DR. RONALD S.
RANKIN, individuals, and JOHN DOES 150,

Case No. 010905108
Honorable Timothy Hanson

Defendants

The Court on December 19, 2001 heard argument on the defendants' Motions to Dismiss
plaintiffs' complaint. The plaintiffs were represented by Thor B. Roundy; defendants McKayDee Hospital Center and Intermountain Health Care, Inc. were represented by Paul D. Van
Komen; Ivan D. Wright, M.D. was represented by Robert G. Wright; and defendants Harold
Vonk, M.D. and Ronald S. Rankin, M.D. were represented by John David Ference. The Court,

having heard oral argument from counsel and having reviewed and considered the memoranda
and affidavits submitted by the parties, finds as follows:
1.

Because matters outside the pleading were presented and considered by the Court,

the motions to dismiss were treated as motions for summary judgment under Rule 12(b) and
disposed of as provided in Rule 56.
2.

The Court finds that a question of fact exists regarding whether a request for

prelitigation panel review was "filed" with the Division of Occupational and Professional
Licensing.
3.

However, the Court finds that it is undisputed that neither the plaintiffs nor their

counsel complied with the requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(2)(b) that the request for
prelitigation hearing "shall be mailed to all health care providers named in the notice and
request." In light of the plaintiffs' failure to mail the request for prelitigation to any of the health
care providers, the Court finds that plaintiffs failed to comply with the statutory requirements
which "are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation."
4.

The Court therefore concludes that the Court has no jurisdiction based on the

legislative mandates set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-141 et seq.
5.

Because plaintiffs did not satisfy the conditions precedent to commencing

litigation, the Court concludes that plaintiffs could not commence their action. Further, because
the plaintiffs' action could not be and was not commenced, this Court lacks jurisdiction and is
compelled to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint.
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the plaintiffs
-2-

did not satisfy the statutory conditions precedent to commencing litigation and therefore the
defendants' Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED and the above-entitled action against the
defendants SHALL BE AND IS HEREBY DISMISSEI
DATED this

tf davof

3-A

Imothy Hans
District Court

o-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I herebv certifv that on the

day of Januarv. 2002.1 caused to be served bv the method

indicated below a true and correct copy of the attached and foregoing proposed ORDER OF
DISMISSAL to the following:
VIA FACSIMILE
VIA HAND DELIVERY
VIA U.S. MAIL
VLA FEDERAL EXPRESS

Thor B. Roundy
275 East South Temple. Suite 150
Salt Lake Cirv. Utah 84111

VIA FACSIMILE
VTA HAND DELIVERY
VLA U.S. MAIL
VLA FEDERAL EXPRESS

Robert G. Wright
Richards Brandt Miller & Nelson
700 Key Bank Tower. 50 South Main Street
P O. Box 2465
Salt Lake Cirv. Utah 84110

VIA FACSIMILE
VIA HAND DELIVERY
VIA U.S. MAIL
VLA FEDERAL EXPRESS

Richard Campbell
Campbell & Campbell
2485'Grant Ave. =£00
Osden Utah. 84401
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